

**TOP SECRET**

25X1A

**[REDACTED]-2753-63**  
**Copy 4**

10 June 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence**

**SUBJECT : Views Concerning Transfer of U-2 Aircraft to CIA**

**REFERENCE : Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense to the DCI, dated 5 June 1963, subject: Transfer of U-2 Aircraft to CIA ([REDACTED]-6734-63)**

25X1A

1. Assignment of U-2 aircraft must, in the final analysis, be determined by the needs of the U. S. Government. It is highly possible that outstanding requirements exceed the assets available. In this event the distribution of such assets must be made on a priority basis. The mission priority should be as follows:

- a. Overflight photo/[REDACTED] reconnaissance of denied territory. 25X1D
- b. [REDACTED] 25X1D
- c. Peripheral photo/[REDACTED] reconnaissance 25X1D
- d. Support of space projects and R&D (variable priority - some very low)
- e. [REDACTED] 25X1D

Alternate means of accomplishing each task must also be considered, including the adequacy of other methods of accomplishing peripheral operations.

2. Of the tasks the U-2 aircraft is capable of performing the overriding requirement of overflight reconnaissance is unquestionable. Under present circumstances this requirement can be satisfied with a continuing inventory of nine aircraft. Basic policy must be firmly established to maintain this level at all times.

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

Handle via [REDACTED] 25X1A

Control System

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**


3. In spite of adequate operational planning, slack periods exist in all programs. Mutual use of assets can be made to accomplish priority missions. For example: SAC initiated overflights of Cuba with two Agency configured aircraft. However, due to long lead times involved, the aircraft assigned to the highest priority mission (overflight) must be modified to accomplish their primary mission.

4. In the event that a complete review of requirements versus assets reveals a need for additional aircraft this should be considered as a separate action. To delay further the development and maintenance of a fleet of aircraft prepared to respond to overflight requirements is unrealistic.

Signed Herbert Scoville, Jr.,

**HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.**  
Deputy Director  
(Research)

Signature Recommended:



25X1A

AAD/OSA

D/FA/OSA/ [redacted] :fec (7 June 1963)

Distribution:

Copies 1 & 2 - Addressee  
Copies 3 & 4 - DD/R  
Copy 5 - AD/OSA  
Copy 6 - D/FA/OSA  
Copy 7 - C/OD/OSA  
Copy 8 - RB/OSA

25X1A

25X1A

Handle via [redacted]  
Control System

**TOP SECRET**